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FROM MODESTY TO MEDIOCRITY
Regulating Public Dispute, 1670–1840: 
The Case of Dutch Divines
Joris van Eijnatten
Charity and peace for all mankind are usually ranged among the characteristic
aspects of the message put forward in the sacred texts on which the Christian reli-
gion is based. Yet the ofﬁcial interpreters of these texts (theologians and eccle-
siastical ofﬁce holders) in Western countries of the early modern period are often
associated with exactly the opposite: with hostility, antagonism, belligerence—
in short, with what was at the time called odium theologicum or theological hatred.
This term of opprobrium was usually bestowed on theologians by the objects of
their attack and by other immediate adversaries, by critics of ecclesiastical
inﬂuence (often jurists and philosophers; sometimes physicians), and by the rep-
resentatives of suppressed religious minorities. One would of course do well not
to accept such accusations at face value. Nevertheless, it is a notion that crops up
regularly in early modern intellectual and religious history that theologians, espe-
cially those who belonged to the state church and held orthodox doctrinal views,
too often displayed an antisocial tendency toward disputatiousness.
The expression odium theologicum (like its twin, rabies theologorum, or the
insanity of theologians) seems a contradiction in terms, and drawing attention to
such contradictions was a major theme of early modern anticlericalism.1 What,
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however, did the theologians have to say for themselves? How did they resolve
the contradiction between the call for universal peace that the Scriptures
enjoined upon them to explain and what they themselves actually did in the
social, ecclesiastical, and intellectual arena? As a contribution to a symposium on
dispute, this essay is concerned, ﬁrst, with the way these theologians rationalized
their quarrels, but also, second, with how the recoil from early modern dispu-
tatiousness contributed to an evolving culture of self-conscious mediocrity—a
culture in which mediocre and middling eventually became high compliments. The
larger question raised here is whether moderation, the avoidance of extremes and
contentious claims, has an intrinsic relation to what today we mean by mediocrity.
This contribution is limited in scope to the northern Netherlands, to
Protestantism, and to the period between 1670 and 1840. During those years,
the northern Netherlands constituted a more or less uniﬁed territory: the Dutch
Republic until 1795, the Batavian Republic with an interlude of French rule
between 1795 and 1813, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the remainder
of the period. Dutch theological history during this time was dominated by
Protestantism, particularly in its Reformed or Calvinist variety. Something could
certainly be said about Roman Catholicism (which comprised a very large minor-
ity in the Netherlands), if only to demonstrate that none of the developments dis-
cussed here is inherently Protestant. However, Roman Catholics will be left out
of consideration since they rarely participated in public debate until the ﬁrst
decades of the nineteenth century.
The period in question is one of important changes in the way public dis-
pute was intellectually legitimized. Still relatively fresh in the memories of divines
who lived around 1670 was the conﬂict over Arminianism of the ﬁrst two decades
of the century. These disputes over freedom of the will and divine predestination
had brought the United Provinces to the brink of civil war, and those disputes
had been resolved by military power and the public enforcement of dogmatic
decisions made by the Synod of Dort (1618–19). Theologians were well aware
of the social and political dangers of disputes over dogma. Nevertheless, by 1670
a new and equally complicated dispute over doctrinal issues had divided the the-
ological ranks. This time, the dispute concerned the question of how best to
interpret the Bible. Should the Old and New Testaments be seen as an essen-
tial, unchanging unity (the position of the so-called Voetians, who followed the
ideas of Gisbert Voet [1588–1676]), or should the books of Scripture be regarded
as the gradual unfolding of a deeper divine plan (the point of view of the “Coc-
ceians,” who took their point of departure in the ideas of Johann Coch or Coc-
ceius [1603–69])? Connected with this dispute was a conﬂict over the relations
between theology and philosophy, especially Cartesian philosophy, to which
many Cocceian divines were attracted. In short, the seventeenth-century Nether-
lands were rife with major theological disputes. A century and a half later, by con-
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trast, the majority of divines avoided strife as best they could. Dispute, in the
three or four decades before 1840, was simply not done.
Changes in the nature of public debate may be said to fall into three phases
(though with considerable overlaps between them): 1670–1750, 1750–1800, and
1800–1840. The method best used, perhaps, to examine these changes is that
of conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte). Conceptual history involves the analy-
sis of variations and modiﬁcations in the meaning of words over the course of
time, and analysis of the appearance of new words, with reference to their use
in various linguistic and social contexts.2 Although the source material here con-
sists almost wholly of texts produced by theologians, above all academic theolo-
gians, the focus in each period shifts from one kind of “public” to another:3 from
an academic, ecclesiastical, and confessional public in the ﬁrst phase; to a broad,
opinionated, and “enlightened” public in the second; to a “national” public in the
third. In order to obtain some idea of the kind of concepts used in legitimizing
public dispute, it may be useful, at the outset, to take a closer look at a typical aca-
demic text on theological quarreling and to follow this exercise with a brief out-
line of the vocabulary involved in that and other texts.
The Model Divine
The academic theologian Herman Wits or Witsius (1636–1708) was regarded
throughout the eighteenth century as a paragon of theological modesty. “Com-
posure, peaceableness, and humility guided his mouth and pen,” said one clerical
commentator in 1795, a judgment that would have been seconded by any of his
colleagues.4 Wits had gained this reputation in part through his lifelong efforts
to mediate in theological disputes. For example, asked to give his counsel in a
conﬂict among English Presbyterians, Wits wrote his Conciliatory, or Irenical Ani-
madversions on the Controversies Agitated in Britain under the Unhappy Names of
Antinomians and Neonomians (1696).5 In the wake of the Glorious Revolution of
1688, when the Dutch Stadtholder William III became king of England, Wits
advised positively on the possibility of uniting Anglicans and Calvinists.6 His per-
sonal device was “unity in necessary things, freedom in the non-necessary, and
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2. Cf. Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank
van Vree, eds., History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998).
3. The classic treatment of the idea of the “public sphere”
is, of course, Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffent-
lichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen
Gesellschaft (Neuwied: Herman Luchterhand Verlag,
1962).
4. Annaeus Ypey, Beknopte letterkundige geschiedenis der sys-
tematische godgeleerdheid, 3 vols. (Haarlem, 1793–98), 2.164.
5. This is the title of the English translation of 1807; the
text originally appeared in Latin as Animadversiones ireni-
cae (1696); a Dutch translation appeared as Vredelievende
aanmerkingen (1754).
6. Jan van den Berg, “Dutch Calvinism and the Church of
England in the Period of the Glorious Revolution,” in
Religious Currents and Cross-Currents: Essays on Early Mod-
ern Protestantism and the Protestant Enlightenment (Leiden:
Brill, 1999), 163–82.
prudence and charity in both.”7 Although he did not found a theological school,
he did substantially inﬂuence developments in Dutch theology by his mediat-
ing stance in the Voetian-Cocceian conﬂicts. A pupil of Voet himself, Wits devel-
oped a theological system based on notions he had gleaned from the Cocceians.
No wonder, then, that Wits inaugurated his professorship at Leiden in
1698 with an address titled Theologus modestus, a response to decades of heated
controversy over Cartesianism and Cocceianism.8 A brief analysis of the contents
of this relatively concise oration may reveal what a late-seventeenth-century
divine understood by modesty. Wits had resolved to speak on modesty, the virtue
most beﬁtting theologians, but also the one most ignored by disputatious divines.
Modesty, as he deﬁned the word, is that equanimity of a well-composed mind by
which someone, reﬂecting moderately upon himself and positively upon others,
acts with prudent moderation as beﬁts the kind, character, and consequence of
the matters he must treat.9 A modest man neither despises nor admires himself.
He values without jealousy God’s gifts in others. He has learned to control his
passions, and thus to restrain his mind, his tongue, and his pen. He is neither too
soft nor too rigid, but pliant. He is mild without being timid, patient without
being indifferent, serious without being grim, resilient without being boastful,
and constant without being obstinate.
Wits then sets out to show how a theologian, if he is to earn the reputation
of being modest, should actually learn, teach, and live. It is clear that he who
has not been taught himself cannot teach others, and that he who does not
respect the virtue Christians call humility cannot be taught at all. The acknowl-
edgment of one’s own ignorance is the ﬁrst step toward true wisdom. “Let him
become a fool, that he may be wise,” says Paul (1 Cor. 3:18). The modest the-
ologian must empty his mind of all preconceptions and accept the authority of
divine revelation, even where the human mind is too limited to grasp it—ubi
mirari, non rimari, sapientia summa est: knowing where to marvel and not to
inquire is the highest wisdom.
As a teacher, the modest divine must keep in mind that he is only an inter-
preter, who should neither add to, nor remove from, what has been revealed. To
intentionally misinterpret the simple words of Scripture and detract from the
extraordinary, the miraculous, or the remarkable is worse than immodesty; it
amounts to impertinence, slander, and impiety. On the other hand, a modest the-
ologian need not accept at face value the interpretation of his peers. Nothing is
more alien to the nature of Christianity or to the freedom of the New Testament
than that a single interpreter should compel his brothers to accept his own read-
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7. The phrase in full runs: “In necessariis unitatem custo-
diant, in non necessariis libertatem, in utrisque pruden-
tiam et charitatem, in omnibus conscientiam inoffensam
in diem Domini.”
8. Herman Wits, Theologus modestus (Leiden, 1698); also
in Wits, Miscelleanorum sacrorum libri, 2 vols. (Leiden,
1736), 2.705–15.
9. Wits, Theologus modestus, 14.
ing of the sacred texts. However learned we may be, we are all brothers who sit
at the feet of one Master. Anyone who arrogates to himself power over his fellow
pupils trespasses on the fundamental rules of Christian education: a “modest the-
ologian therefore does not passionately force his own ideas upon another, nor
does he endure with fear and credulity the ideas that others force upon him.” The
Word of God should be discussed in serene and simple terms, even when it is
defended against those who err. Wits condemns the ancient and modern divines
who so often castigated their opponents with terms of abuse (“dogs,” “pigs,”
“windbags,” and so on), and he enjoins upon his listeners to understand that heav-
enly wisdom is pure, peaceful, gentle, docile, full of mercy and good fruits, and
free from partiality and hypocrisy ( James 3:17). Wits goes on to point out the
need for theologians to follow these principles in daily life, admonishing his col-
leagues not to indulge in factiousness; and then he concludes with an ode to mod-
esty. What, he asks, will dispose the mind to obedience to God? Modesty. What
will deter the mind from temerity toward the mysteries, or help convince oth-
ers of the truth? Modesty. What will prevent disputes, end the useless contro-
versies that so often agitate people, and dissolve the divisions in church and
school? Modesty. What will foster a praiseworthy victory in God’s battle? Mod-
esty. What will join together minds and hands in a sacred and inviolable bond
of peace and friendship? It is modesty, the queen of virtues.
As Wits’s biographer notes, the address Theologus modestus (which elicited
“great applause from all his listeners”) was largely an echo of an address he had
given at the University of Franeker more than two decades before.10 In this pre-
vious address, De vero theologo (1675), Wits had likewise presented his views on
the spiritual and intellectual requisites of a theologian. He had argued that a
divine should adhere closely to the Holy Scriptures in learning, teaching, and liv-
ing.11 In the later oration, Wits similarly stressed adherence to Scripture, but his
emphasis had shifted from piety to modesty.
A Note on Vocabulary
In Theologus modestus, Wits associated modesty with both moderation (or control
of the passions) and mediation (or impartiality). To trace developments in eigh-
teenth-century discourse on the resolution of disputes, it may be useful to take
a short look at the history of these concepts. Given our focus on the Netherlands,
this approach will involve an examination of several Dutch words. We shall look
in particular at the Dutch equivalents for moderation, modesty, and the mean.
The Dutch word for moderation, moderatie (derived from the Latin mod-
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10. Jan van Genderen, Herman Witsius (’s-Gravenhage:
Guido de Bres, 1953), 93. 
11. The oration is outlined in Van Genderen, Herman
Witsius, 51–52.
eratio and the French modération), which today has an antiquated ﬂavor, was com-
monly used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to denote temperance. A
still well-known example among Dutch linguists is a pun referring to the restraint
promised in 1566 by King Philip II of Spain, in the persecution of Dutch
heretics. The king’s new policy, an early-seventeenth-century historian informs
us, was commonly regarded as moorderatie—as “murderation” rather than mod-
eration.12 The adjective moderaat (moderate) was no less common, and was 
sometimes used in the same breath with vreedzaam (peaceful) to refer to the ideal
clergyman.13 Those who avoided extremes in the religious disputes over Armini-
anism in the early seventeenth century, as well as those who followed the mean
during the political disputes in the Dutch National Convention of 1796, were
known as the moderaten or moderates.14 Political theorists often praised Dutch
republican government as conducive to the exercise of prudent moderation (voor-
sigtige gemaetigtheit), resulting in a harmonious administration and a political
order based on friendship, reason, mutual indulgence, and persuasion.15 The
signiﬁcation of the term remained fairly constant.
In the course of the period, words of comparable meaning but of Germanic
rather than Latin or Romance derivation began to put moderatie in the shade.
Gematigdheid, like moderatie, was used to refer to the composure characteristic of
people able to control their passions, people who act and express themselves with
moderation and self-discipline. Given the Protestant emphasis on the spoken and
written word, the familiarity of this term to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Dutchmen would have been inﬂuenced considerably by the ofﬁcial Bible trans-
lation of 1637, which translated the Greek sophronismos in 2 Tim. 1:7 with
gematigdheid rather than moderatie.16 The choice by the Dutch Bible translators
of gematigdheid was probably related to contemporary medical usage of the
term—and this is the sense evoked in the Vulgate, which used sobrietas for sophro-
nismos, and in the King James Version (1611), which used the phrase “of a sound
mind.” The Dutch Bible commentators of 1637 explained that gematigdheid
referred to “a moderate or sound mind” (gematight ofte gesont verstant), which
should be adjoined to stoutheartedness so that the latter does not turn into rash-
ness, ranting, raving, and immodesty.17 In the seventeenth century, gematigdheid
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12. Matthias de Vries et al., Woordenboek der Nederlandsche
Taal (’s-Gravenhage, 1882–; CD-Rom version, Rotter-
dam, 1995). S.v. “Moderatie.” Henceforth cited as WNT.
13. WNT, s.v. “Moderatie” (Predikanten . . . die . . . van een
moderaet en vreedsaem humeur zijn, 1694).
14. WNT, s.v. “Moderatie.”
15. Lieven de Beaufort, Verhandeling van de vryheit in den
burgerstaet [Treatise on freedom in the civil state] (Leiden,
1737).
16. WNT, s.v. “Gematigdheid.”
17. Biblia, dat is: de gantsche H. Schrifture, vervattende alle
de canonijcke boecken des Ouden en des Nieuwen Testaments
(Amsterdam, 1657), n. 22 to 2 Tim. 1:7. Likewise, the
Greek sophroneo in 2 Cor. 5:13 is translated as “gematight
van sinnen,” which literally means “of moderated passions”
(the Vulgate has sobrius, and the Authorized [King James]
Version sober).
was used as the equivalent for the Latin temperatura and temperamentum, or the
French température and tempérament, which in turn referred to the correct and
balanced mixture of bodily humors in traditional Galenic medicine. This med-
ical background is evident, for example, in the use of the term temperantia in a
seventeenth-century disputation “On the Abuses Related to Sustenance and
Feasts.”18
With the passage of time, the noun gematigdheid and the adjective gematigd
were no longer associated with humoral theory but only with the underlying
ethics. A moderate person rationalizes, acts with composure, and understands the
value of humility; he is temperate, avoids extremes, and keeps to the mean.19 This
brings us to the meaning of mean: middelmaat, literally “the measure of the mid-
dle,” was commonly used to render into Dutch a notion developed by Aristotle
and praised by Horace—the idea of the aurea mediocritas or golden mean. The
rhymed sayings of a mid-seventeenth-century Calvinist who was strongly
inﬂuenced by both the Bible and classical scholarship illustrate the popularity
of the golden mean: middel-maet houdt staet, on-maet vergaet (the average per-
sists while immoderation perishes) and noch te weynigh, noch te veel, middel-maet
is’t beste deel (neither too much nor too little, for the mean is the best).20
The term gulden or gouden middelmaat (golden mean) remained popular for
as long as the opinion-making elite was trained in classical scholarship—which
is to say, until well into the nineteenth century. A related term is middelmatigheid,
the quality possessed by those who keep to the golden mean. The term may be
translated as mediocrity, which in the original Latin mediocritas could have a pos-
itive connotation (“the state of avoiding extremes”). The latter sense of the word
middelmatigheid is obsolete; in present-day usage, the term invariably refers to
the condition of being second-rate. There is, incidentally, one other contempo-
rary meaning of middelmatigheid that cannot be found in the dictionaries but that
illustrates the semantic proximity of mediocrity to modesty. In 1779, a theolo-
gian published an essay “On the Title of the Greek Clergy: Your Mediocrity”—
a title, as this divine observed, that was meant to convey a sense of humility. But,
he continued, Greek patriarchs were not particularly modest, since they also
referred to themselves as “the most holy” and “the most learned,” although their
piety and their learning were, in fact, quite mediocre.21
Related both to moderation and the mean is, ﬁnally, the word modesty itself.
The Latin original modestia was normally translated into Dutch as bescheidenheid,
the quality of being modest or humble. While in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
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18. Gisbert Voet, Selectae disputationes theologicae, 5 vols.
(Utrecht, 1648–69), 4.385–402.
19. WNT, s.v. “Gematigd” and “Matiging.”
20. WNT, s.v. “Middelmaat.”
21. Petrus Nieuwland, Lectiones historico-ecclestiasticae, ofte
vermaaklijkheden uit de kerkgeschiedenis (Den Haag, 1779),
650–51: “Over den titel der Grieksche geestelijkheid:
Uwe middelmaatigheid”; the Greek term for medioc-
rity/modesty is metriotees.
century Dutch, bescheidenheid could mean literally moderation, the word gradu-
ally came to refer to a lack of presumption.22 Modesty was the result of judgment
perfected by experience; it was an aggregate of virtues, or even the mother of
all virtues.23 A bescheiden or modest person denoted someone who is not pre-
sumptuous, whose actions or demands are, in other words, not immoderate. And
so we have completed the circle, from moderation via the mean and modesty
back to moderation. Of course, these interrelated terms were often connected,
by semantic or textual proximity, with other words. Early modern texts regularly
employ a whole cluster of words, best summed up under the heading of prudence
(voorzichtigheid, prudentie). Included under this heading are the terms for wisdom
(wijsheid ), discretion (beleid ), judgment (verstandig oordeel, welberadenheid ), cir-
cumspection (bedachtzaamheid ), sensibleness (bezonnenheid ), and discernment
(doorzicht)—to list but a few. Such words generally refer to the ability to act
knowledgeably regarding, and with insight into, the possible consequences of a
decision, and the ability to attain a desired end by avoiding unnecessary risk or
disadvantage.24
When commenting on the nature of disputes, Dutch theologians returned
again and again to the same triad of modesty, moderation, and the mean. And
although the triad may be found throughout the period under consideration here,
it is conspicuous that divines of the ﬁrst phase (1670–1750) had a particular lik-
ing for modesty, those of the second phase (1750–1800) for moderation, and
those of the third phase (1800–1840) for the mean.
Modesty: Containing Conflict
Armed with a rich vocabulary, theologians were able to set about solving the
kinds of dispute that had been so notorious since the humanists of the Renais-
sance had condemned the scholastics for quarreling over supposedly abstruse
philosophical issues. Yet even the humanists had not denied the usefulness of dis-
pute as such. They merely rejected dispute for the sake of dispute, as well as the
excesses attending on speciﬁc quarrels. In fact, controversy was the sine qua non
of early modern intellectual life. By 1670, dispute had been ﬁrmly institutional-
ized in the academic curriculum. Apart from public and private lectiones, profes-
sors were expected to preside over disputationes, in which students had to learn to
defend their theses and to parry objections. But they were required to do so while
observing a moral code: disputing students were required, above all, to practice
modesty.
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22. WNT, s.v. “Bescheidenheid” and “Bescheiden.” For
the older sense of these words, cf. 1 Peter 2:18, where the
Dutch Bible translation of 1637 uses bescheiden and the
Authorized (King James) Version uses gentle.
23. “Over de bescheidenheid,” in Christelijk maandschrift,
voor den beschaafden stand 22 (1843): 218; the author cites
an early-eighteenth-century deﬁnition.
24. WNT, s.v. “Voorzichtigheid.”
In practically all the rationes studiorum—guidelines for academic students
—which appeared between 1670 and 1840, modesty was stressed as a principal
virtue. One accredited expert in controversial or polemical theology listed three
moral requirements for theology students: uprightness (probitas), assiduousness
(diligentia), and modesty (modestus). A learned but immodest young man is no bet-
ter than a beautiful but immoral woman. Modesty should be to the student what
prudence is to an experienced divine.25 Etienne Gaussen’s De studii theologici
ratione (written by a Frenchman but one of the most popular Protestant rationes
studiorum in both the Netherlands and Germany) similarly provided a list of
moral and intellectual requirements for theology students. The necessary virtues
singled out by Gaussen were humility (humilitas) and modesty (modestia).26
Another leading theologian discussed the threefold injunction that ministers be
pious, prudent, and modest.27 In 1836, Johannes Clarisse, author of the last tra-
ditional ratio studiorum in the Netherlands, still recommended modesty, peace-
ableness, gravity, emotional control, composure, and prudence.28
Thus it was hardly self-contradictory for an inﬂuential academic theolo-
gian to preside, in 1652, over a disputation “On Moderation and Toleration.” In
this disputation, moderatio was deﬁned, explicitly from an ecclesiastical point of
view, as that “temperament connected with Christian charity and prudence,”
exercised by the church, or by persons and gatherings within the church, in order
“to introduce or maintain, conﬁrm, restore, and re-establish peace and unity
among the churches.”29 Moderation is the means to an end—the termination of
ecclesiastical discord; by contrast, toleration is the formal acceptance of certain
existing defects (that is, the admission of a measure of disunity and dispute within
the church). Such solemn afﬁrmations on the part of divines-to-be that they will
respect a common moral code do not, of course, necessarily imply that theol-
ogy students were peaceable and conducted their academic disputations with due
modesty. In 1661, in the midst of the debates over Cartesianism, the senate of the
University of Utrecht was obliged to ask the city government to put up a fence
around the chair of the defending student, so that his opponents could not phys-
ically attack him.30
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25. Johannes Hoornbeek, “Dissertatio de controversiis, et
disputationibus theologicis,” in Summa controversiarum reli-
gionis: cum infidelibus, haereticis, schismaticis, 2d ed. (Utrecht,
1658), 35–38.
26. Dutch editions of Gaussen’s essays appeared in 1678,
1697, 1790, and 1792. I have used a German edition:
Stephanus Gaussenius, “De studii theologici ratione,” in
Dissertationes theologicae (Halle, 1727), 3; Gaussen also
mentions composure (temperantia) and piety (devotio).
27. Franciscus Burmannus, “Consilium de studio theo-
logico feliciter instituendo,” in Synopsis theologiae, & speci-
atim oeconomiae foederum Dei, ab initio saeculorum usque 
ad consummationem eorum, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1699), 2.685–
89.
28. Johannes Clarisse, Encyclopaediae theologicae epitome,
perpetua annotatione, literaria potissimum, illustrata (Leiden,
1835), 10.
29. Gisbert Voet, Politica ecclesiastica, 4 vols. (Amsterdam,
1663–76), 4.364–78. “De moderatione & tolerantia”
(deﬁnition on 364). Voet followed earlier Calvinists’
responses to the Remonstrant appropriation of moderatio
as a means to tolerantia; cf. the Calvinist Jacob Trigland,
Den recht-gematichden Christen: Ofte vande ware moderatie,
ende verdrachsaemheyt (Amsterdam, 1615).
30. Gerhard W. Kernkamp, De Utrechtsche Academie
1636–1815 (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1936), 148.
Seventeenth-century universities in general, and theological faculties in
particular, were not immediately concerned with the progressive accumulation
of knowledge through research and publication. They were basically concerned
with educating an elite and maintaining the social order; and the former was
regarded as a means of achieving the latter. The public to which the various
reﬂections on modesty were addressed consisted in the ﬁrst place of an academic,
if theological, public, including students as well as professors (who generally used
students’ disputations to expound their own controversial views). In another
sense, the public ideally involved in the exercise of modesty was the ecclesiasti-
cal public—all those, from elder to minister, holding ofﬁce in the church. In a
still broader sense, however, the discourse on modesty concerned what might be
called a confessional public. Like any other established church, the Calvinists’
Dutch Reformed Church, in close cooperation with the political administration,
used a variety of monitoring agencies and defense mechanisms—ranging from
theological faculties to a well-organized system of church councils—to maintain
and protect “public” truth. The confessional public was a public qualiﬁed by con-
fessional rules, controlled by a clerical estate, backed by political power, and
extending itself in time and space by avoiding, controlling, suppressing, or erad-
icating heterodoxy and other socioreligious deviations from its (public) domain.31
As a way of managing dispute and tolerating deviance, the pursuit of modesty was
integral to the maintenance of orthodoxy.
The way in which Dutch Arminians—who have been consistently por-
trayed by church historians since the nineteenth century as the chief advocates
of theological moderation—used terms such as modesty does not really vary from
the way their orthodox Calvinist opponents used it. The term moderation appears
frequently in an academic address by Jacob Arminius himself, “On Reconciling
Religious Dissensions among Christians”: there it is used as a means not to end
dispute but to regulate controversy.32 Uses of modest, modesty, and modestly in book
titles are often a distinct signal of the author’s polemical intentions—that is to
say, a mark of his desire to maintain and defend the confessional public 
by means of dispute and to extend that public through persuasion.33 Disputes
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31. For a case study of the communication processes
involved in the defense of orthodoxy, see Martin Gierl,
Pietismus und Aufklärung: Theologische Polemik und die Kom-
munikationsreform der Wissenschaft am Ende des 17. Jahrhun-
derts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997); see also
Georg Braungart, “Zur Rhetorik der Polemik in der frühen
Neuzeit,” in Feindbilder: Die Darstellung des Gegners in der
politischen Publizistik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, ed.
Franz Bosbach (Köln: Böhlau, 1992), 1–21.
32. Jacob Arminius, “De componendo dissidio religionis
inter Christianos,” in Opera theologica (Frankfurt, 1635).
33. Cf. the characteristic terminology in the title of a book
by the Protestant controversialist Samuel Maresius: Con-
cordia discors & Antichristus revelatus: id est ill. viri Hugonis
Grotii apologia pro papa & papismo . . . modeste refutata duobus
libris (Amsterdam, 1642). Another example of this balance
between “polemicism” and “irenicism”: Christoph Wit-
tich, Theologia pacifia, in qua vari problemata theologica inter
reformatos theologos . . . modeste respondentur (Leiden, 1671);
Johannes Braun, Necessaria atque modesta defensio: contra
injustam protestationem falsamque narrationem apologeticam
Johanis Marckii (Groningen, 1687).
were meant to result in persuasion, but not in the proliferation of intellectual
warfare.
The churchman Johannes van den Honert, one of the last academic mono-
liths of eighteenth-century orthodoxy, still defended such controlled disputa-
tiousness in his address “De mutua Christianorum tolerantia” (1745). Christians,
he observed, may openly defend their own particular confessions and “frankly
and modestly” (libere modesteque) contest the contradictory views of others, in
order to establish the truth.34 In the eighteenth century, as people struggled to
deﬁne and expand notions of freedom, the term modesty was more often than not
accompanied by frankness or sincerity. Modesty and candor were now the twin
virtues universally accepted as indispensable to public debate—accepted as the
moral categories required for one who would freely reject religious otherness,
even when the otherness in question was that of the state church.35 In 1781, the
author of a pro-Arminian theological treatise could still be praised as being expe-
rienced in the “Theological Battle School” and, at the same time, remarkable for
his humility.36
The period between 1670 and 1750 may be seen as the heyday of the con-
fessional public. A relative degree of religious stability had been achieved. Divines
were generally as concerned to keep the peace within their own denominations
as they were anxious to maintain a balance among the publieke kerk (the public
Calvinist church), the various smaller Protestant denominations (notably Luther-
ans, Arminians, and Mennonites), and the very large Roman Catholic minority.37
This attitude toward containing or controlling conﬂict and dissension in the pub-
lic sphere gave rise to a lengthy series of academic addresses, repeating, elabo-
rating on, or varying Herman Wits’s message of 1675 and 1698. A host of aca-
demic theologians in the Netherlands and abroad discussed, in learned Latin, the
virtues of modesty, peaceableness, and piety: Johannes à Marck at Groningen in
1682, Paulus Hulsius at Groningen in 1691, Friedrich Spanheim Jr. at Leiden in
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34. Joris van Eijnatten, Mutua Christianorum tolerantia.
Irenicism and Toleration in the Netherlands: The Stinstra affair
(1740–1745), Studi e testi per la storia della tolleranza in
Europa nei secoli XVI–XVIII, 2 (Florence: Olschki, 1998),
300; cf. also the common triad “libere, modeste, candide”
(301). The Dutch translation has respectively vrymoediglyk
en sediglyk and vrymoedig, sedig en opregt; Joan van den
Honert, “Academische redenvoering over de onderlinge
verdraagsaamheid der christenen,” in Derde versameling
van heilige mengelstoffen (Leiden, 1747), 343, 351.
35. E.g., De advocaat der Roomsch-Catholyke Kerk bescheiden
en vrymoedig beoordeelt (Utrecht, 1773).
36. Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen . . . (Amsterdam,
1763–1811), 1.138-39 (1781), on Johannes Drieberge, Ver-
handeling over Gods voorschikking en genade (Amsterdam, 1781).
37. A similar development occurred in the so-called
Republic of Letters in the decades around 1700, when
modesty, as opposed to pride, was repeatedly stressed as a
standard of scholarly behavior and a means of fostering
interconfessional cooperation. See, e.g., Anne Goldgar,
Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic
of Letters, 1680–1750 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1995), 158–63 (on modesty) and 215–18 (on mod-
eration); Joseph M. Levine, “Strife in the Republic of Let-
ters,” in Hans Bots and Françoise Waquet, Commercium
litterarium: Forms of Communication in the Republic of Let-
ters, 1600–1750 (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University
Press, 1994), 301–19.
1693, Jean-Alphonse Turrettini at Geneva in 1705, Johann Budde at Jena in 1705,
Daniel Maichel at Tübingen in 1722, Samuel Werenfels at Basel in 1722, Her-
man Venema and Albert Melchioris at Franeker in 1724, Johannes Drieberge at
the Amsterdam Remonstrant Seminary in 1737, Petrus Laan at Franeker in 1739,
David Mill at Utrecht in 1743, Johann Lorenz Mosheim at Helmstedt in 1723,
and Michael Bertling at Groningen in 1752.38 These academic orations were
widely known, even if they were not universally appreciated;39 and their com-
bined effect was to prepare the average divine, spiritually and intellectually, for
the civil ethic of politeness, which had begun to make signiﬁcant headway by the
1760s.
Moderation: Politeness as Civil Ethic
In an inaugural address at the University of Leiden, “On the True Theologian,
Who Is Not Truly Orthodox unless He Be Truly Pious” (1761), the academic tra-
dition of orations on modesty was once again revived, on this occasion by the the-
ologian Ewald Hollebeek.40 The point of Hollebeek’s address was that piety is at
least as important as doctrine. Comparing the church of his own day with that of
the early Christians, he condemned the superﬂuity of doctrine burdening con-
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38. Johannes à Marck, De sopiendis in ecclesia litibus (1682).
Paulus Hulsius, De modestia theologi (1691). Friedrich
Spanheim Jr., De prudentia theologi (1693); for Spanheim,
prudence amounted mainly to the repudiation of novelties.
Cf. also Johannes Hoornbeek, De prudentia (1665). Jean-
Alphonse Turrettini, De theologo veritatis et pacis studioso, in
Turrettini, Opera omnia theologica, philosophica et philolog-
ica (1776), 3.365–85, translated as “Eene redenvoering
over de pligt van eenen waarheid- en vredelievenden
godgeleerden” (1746). Cf. also Turrettini, De eruditionis et
pietatis nexu, in Opera omnia 3.454–67; and his well-known
Nubes testium pro moderato et pacifico de rebus theologicis judi-
cio, et instituenda inter protestantes concordia (1720). Through-
out the eighteenth century, Jean-Alphonse Turrettini
counted as the paragon of theological modesty. According
to the most popular review periodical of the 1770s, his
“learning and judgement are valued by all modest Divines”
(Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen [1770], 1.533), while his
writings were excellent guides for the exercise of theolog-
ical “moderation and peaceableness” and the formation of
“truly able and also modest divines” (Vaderlandsche Letter-
Oefeningen [1776], 1.561–64). Johann Budde, De veritatis
et pietatis nexu necessario (1705). Daniel Maichel, Disserta-
tio de moderatione theologica, deducta ex principiis religionis
protestantium (1722), translated as “Verhandeling van de
theologische bescheidenheit” (1722). Samuel Werenfels,
De recto theologi zelo (1722), translated as “Redenvoering
van den waren en valschen yver der godgeleerden” (1724).
Herman Venema, De zelo veritatis et pietatis genuino et char-
itatis pleno; Albert Melchioris, De necessari veritatis et pietatis
coniugio (1724). For a later Franeker address, cf. Johannes
Ratelband, De pietate Christiana theologo prorsus necessaria
(1767). Johannes Drieberge, De veritatis et pacis studio coni-
ungendo (unpublished). Petrus Laan, De prudentia theologo
observanda (1739). David Mill, De erudita pietate (1743).
Johann Lorenz Mosheim, De theologo non contentioso ad 2
Timoth. 2:23–24 (1723–24; actually a series of disputations
written by Mosheim); a Dutch translation was included in
Mosheim, Verklaaring van het Euangelium van Johannes
(1779), 544–672. Michael Bertling, De modestia modestaque
sapientia, theologo digna ac necessaria (1752).
39. Academic jurists, too, contemplated similar issues in
their orations: cf. Gottfried Mascovius at Harderwijk, De
modestia veterum jurisconsultorum (1729); apparently an
echo of Antonius Matthaeus at Utrecht, De modestia
veterum jurisconsultorum (1644). The same applies to aca-
demic philosophers: cf. at Deventer, Dionysius Andreas
Röell, De modesto philosopho (1710); at Utrecht, Johannes
Horthemels, De libertate philosophandi debita cum modestia
circa revelata (1742); at Groningen, Cornelis de Waal, De
sentiendi dicendique cum libertate tum modestia, atque huius
utriusque virtutis philosopho inprimis necessaria conjunctione
(1805).
40. Ewald Hollebeek, De theologo non vere orthodoxo, nisi
vere pio (Leiden, 1762).
temporary Christians and lamented the general loss of piety, moderation, justice,
peace, love, and other values. The true theologian, he observed, is not one who
maintains and defends traditional truths with blind faith while condemning 
and slandering the doctrines of others. True orthodoxy entails an inward con-
dition; it derives from the ethical truths of the Bible, not from an immoderate
passion to protect or foster a religious faction to which one belongs only by virtue
of birth or upbringing. Unlike earlier addresses on this theme, Hollebeek’s was
not addressed to any confessional public. He was not particularly interested in
maintaining the speciﬁc doctrines of a certain church (as the stricter theologians
in his audience realized well enough: apparently they were not amused by his
address). His oration is primarily concerned, not with the resolution of theo-
logical dispute as a means of maintaining and strengthening the confessional pub-
lic sphere, but with deﬂecting the deist and materialist attack on Christianity by
presenting the Christian faith as both essential to civilization and antithetical to
conﬂict. By the 1760s, the attack of anti-Christian critics was perceived as a direct
assault on the ethic of freedom, reason, and sincerity to which all “polite”
(beschaafde) and “enlightened” (verlichte) citizens aspired.
To put it another way, Hollebeek’s address is representative of a “polite”
civil ethic—of the moral code of a polite, rather than confessional, public sphere.
The development of this polite ethic was closely connected with changes in the
relations between the individual, on the one hand, and church, society, and the
state, on the other hand. The intricate networks of the old regime, characterized
by particularism, patronage, and privilege, were subject to increasing criticism
during and after the 1760s. A new public sphere came into existence, based on
participation rather than patronage. One need think only of the unprecedented
ﬂood of periodicals and other means of publication in this period; the rise of an
articulate publishing caste that sought and obtained a public forum for propos-
als concerning economic, scientiﬁc, educational, religious, and literary reform;
the development of “enlightened” sociability; and the growth of a sense of
national unity and a new political consciousness. The basis for social and politi-
cal stability was no longer sought in the maintenance of order through privilege
and repression, as was the case in the confessional public sphere, but instead
through the formation—by the process of beschaving (or what would be called
Bildung in German, perhaps civilization in English)—of a nationwide community
of citizens.
In this polite public sphere, citizens, civilized both outwardly and inwardly,
would be expected to respond to an ethic of freedom, reason, sincerity, and mod-
eration—an ethic believed to reﬂect the true essence of Christianity (as opposed
to both the dogmatic traditionalism of old-regime theologians and the irrever-
ent libertinism of their deist critics). Hence the supporters of politeness began to
invest heavily in the production of apologetic writings that not only sought to
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prove the simple historical truths of Christendom, but also to explain how the
disputatious orthodoxies of the past had led libertines and atheists to wrongfully
criticize Christianity itself, rather than just the excesses that had rightfully elicited
condemnation. In these apologies, Christianity is associated not with the values
of the confessional elite who guarded public doctrine, but with the values of a
free citizenry, inwardly convinced of the truth of the Christian faith. A minister
of the church must ﬁrst of all combat disbelief—but with prudence and mod-
eration.41
Thus moderation became one of the catchwords of the period, so much so
that modern historians have been ﬁnding it difﬁcult not to label the era as one of
“moderate Enlightenment.”42 The major sins of the land were taken to be iden-
tical with offenses against the polite civil ethic. Apart from mutiny, self-inter-
est, and disloyalty, one minister, in a prayer-day sermon, included among these
sins immoderation and disputatiousness.43 A typical essay title of the period is “A
Clear and Concise Proof That There Can Be No True Felicity without Mod-
eration.”44 In the writings on education that appeared with increasing frequency
as the eighteenth century progressed, young citizens-to-be were instructed to be
peaceable, indulgent, humble, and modest.45 The man who came closest to being
the model citizen of the period, even for the Dutch, was probably the German
poet, writer, and moralist Christian Fürchtegott Gellert (1715–69). He was, one
commentator wrote, a man who not only exhibited impeccable taste, reﬁned
intelligence, incomparable clarity, and heartfelt piety, but also a “moderate and
modest spirit.”46 Writers on moral theology praised these and related virtues as
characteristically Christian: a good example is the German divine Gottfried Less
(1736–97), whose sermons on “the Christian duties of moderation and chastity”
were translated into Dutch.47 Another commentator, in considering a group of
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41. Nicolaus Hoogvliet, De oratoris sacri, in refutandis div-
inae revelationis contemtoribus, prudentia (Leiden, 1771).
42. For the Dutch Enlightenment as a “moderate Enlight-
enment,” see Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, “The Dutch Enlight-
enment: Humanism, Nationalism, and Decline,” in Mar-
garet C. Jacob and Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, eds., The Dutch
Republic in the Eighteenth Century: Decline, Enlightenment,
and Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1992), 197–223. For a related context, cf. Richard B. Sher,
Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The
Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1985).
43. Philipp L. Statius Muller, Het belang der souverainen,
en des volks, in het heilig vieren van een algemeene dank- vast-
en bededag voorgesteld ten dienste der ingezetenen van de 
Nederlandsche Republyk (Amsterdam, s.a.), 69–76.
44. “Kort en duidelijk bewijs, dat ’er zonder gematigdheid
geen waar geluk kan plaats hebben,” in Vaderlandsche Bib-
liotheek van Wetenschap, Kunst en Smaak (Amsterdam,
1789–1811) (1796), 2.115–17.
45. Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen (1795), 1.274–79.
46. Nederlandsche Bibliotheek (Rotterdam, 1774–88) (1774),
1.604 (bedaarden en bescheidenen geest). Among German the-
ologians, one of the most popular was the apologist Johann
Friedrich Jacobi (1712–91), who similarly combined sim-
plicity and clarity in style with “moderation and indul-
gence”; cf. De recensent, of bydragen tot de letterkundige
geschiedenis van onzen tyd, 4 vols. (Amsterdam, 1787–93)
(1792), 3.2. Jacobi’s Abhandlungen über wichtige Gegenstände
der Religion (1773–78; Dutch translation 1788) were gen-
erally valued for the author’s stress on theological modesty;
Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen (1788), 1.181–86.
47. Gottfried Less, De Christelijke pligten van maatigheid
en kuischheid; voorgesteld in twaalf predikatien, which appeared
as volume 3 of Less, De Christelijke leer, aangaande den
inwendigen godsdienst (Utrecht, 1779).
“moderate” German divines, acclaimed their work and ideas as springing from
the “mild source of common humanity, and the most ﬁtting indulgence, which
is so characteristic of the true and original spirit of Christendom.”48
In other words, essays, and also poems, on moderation as a way of life
abounded49 (translations from the English were particularly conspicuous).50
Their number would increase in the nineteenth century, when a moral offen-
sive was unleashed against women, children,51 the destitute, and the working
classes52—particularly in the form of religious “temperance” societies, combat-
ing alcoholism and promoting moderation, if not abstinence.53 Treatises and
pamphlets on physical and spiritual well-being were medical and moral coun-
terparts to the many discussions portraying moderation in religion as a conse-
quence of a healthy balance in temperament. Such a balance effectively thwarted
all inclinations toward “fanaticism” or “enthusiasm”—the irate, bilious, arrogant,
and intolerant attitude of those Christians whose lives were ruled by emotion
rather than reason.54 The most profound expression of this plea for tempera-
mental moderation was Johannes Stinstra’s “Pastoral Letter against Fanaticism”
(1750), in which emotional control and a balanced way of life were recommended
as the best means to form moderate Christians.55 It was commonly believed that
religious zeal need not deteriorate into fanaticism if practiced with “prudent
moderation.”56
Moderation all but turned into a synonym for toleration.57 As early as 1749,
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48. De recensent (1787), 1.431–32.
49. Essays: “Bedenkingen over de maatigheid, met
betrekking tot de verstandlyke vermogens,” in Vaderland-
sche Letter-Oefeningen (1779), 2.170–73; “Eenige aan-
merkingen over de matigheid,” in Vaderlandsche Letter-
Oefeningen (1795), 2.125–35. Poetry: Cornelis Elzevier,
“Eerkroon voor de matigheid,” in Drie dichtproeven (Haar-
lem, 1761).
50. “Over de Maatigheid,” in Nederlandsche Bibliotheek
(1781), 2.52–55, taken from Vicesimus Knox, Essays moral
and literary (London, 1779). “Over de gemaatigdheid,” in
Nederlandsche Bibliotheek (1784), 2.429–31. “Bedenkingen
over de zamenstemming van aandoenlykheid en rede,” in
Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen (1782), 2.526–31, includ-
ing comments on moderation; taken from James Donald-
son, The Elements of Beauty: Also, Reflections on the Harmony
of Sensibility and Reason (1780). Richard Reece provided a
scale by which to measure (im)moderation in his often
reprinted The Domestic Medical Guide (1803); translated as
Nieuwe huisselijke geneeskunde (Amsterdam, 1819).
51. Anon., Maria Adams en Agatha Haller, of De voordee-
len der matigheid: een verhaal voor meisjes van tien tot veertien
jaren (Amsterdam, 1826).
52. Aron Bernstein, Over voedsel en voeding, matigheid en
onmatigheid: een volksboekje (Amsterdam, 1865); translated
from the German. 
53. Cf. Robert Baird, Geschiedenis der matigheidsgezelschap-
pen in de Vereenigde Staten van Amerika (Utrecht, 1837)
(translated from the French version: Histoire des sociétés de
tempérance des États-Unis d’Amérique, 1836). There are
many more examples of temperance-society literature.
54. De recensent (1792), 3.366–75.
55. Johannes Stinstra, Waarschuwinge tegen de geestdrijverij
vervat in een brief aan de doopsgezinden in Friesland (Harlin-
gen, 1750); the booklet was translated into French (1752),
German (1752), and English (1753; 1774).
56. Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen (1776), 1.520 (be-
dachtzaeme gematigdheid).
57. Earlier Dutch examples related in particular to the
conﬂicts between Arminians and Calvinists: e.g., Anti-
dotum ofte hertsterckinghe tegens het schadelijck recept van
Johannes Uutenboogaert, moderatie ghenaemt (Amsterdam,
1616); Corte ende naeckte ontdeckinghe vande bedrieghelijck-
heydt des Dortschen Synodi, in ’t smeden van seeckere artijcke-
len van moderatie en onderlinghe verdraegsaemheyt, tusschen
de Remonstranten ende Contra-Remonstranten (s. l., 1619).
For the English context, cf. John Austin, The Christian
moderator, or, persecution for religion condemned (s. l., 1651).
a more “modest conduct toward the Jews” was urged in a moral weekly. It was
argued that Christians who insulted Jews were morally inferior to a people who
for various reasons failed to acknowledge the truth of Christianity.58 In the pam-
phlet literature of the period, “a Moderate” became a synonym for “a Tolerant.”
Both were identiﬁed with one who kept to the Christian mean and who sought
to prevail over religious differences.59 Toleration entailed the dissolution of dif-
ferences and the development of a common humanity, the way to achieve which
was to exercise “moderation and indulgence.”60 Thus, the combined virtues of
modesty and moderation were generally regarded as instruments keeping the
forces of traditionalism at bay and preventing the new public ethic from back-
sliding into authoritarianism, intellectual obscurity, and hypocrisy. Modesty and
moderation were commonly seen as moral qualities enabling citizens to express
themselves sincerely, openly, and with impunity; again we remark the link
between moderation and frankness. As the Mennonite Johannes Stinstra said in
the early 1740s: “The matter [of religious freedom] obliges us, albeit with Chris-
tian modesty and with humble respect for Your imposing authority, to openly
defend the truth and speak with appropriate candor.” The freedom of sincere
expression, he added, is only denied “by the passion, immodesty and lust for
power” of intolerant theologians.61 Later in the century, the freedom of political
expression (and, therefore, also press freedom) was added to the freedom of reli-
gious expression, but with the same caveat. Burghers were free to voice their
views on government as long as they did so with the “modesty and indulgence
beﬁtting people who are only partially schooled in the matters on which they
wish to judge.”62
Moderation and modesty, rather than being reserved for academic and con-
fessional disputation, were now presented as conditions enabling any free but
polite expression of ideas—including criticism of the formal confessions accepted
by ecclesiastical institutions (as an orthodox commentator noted, to his dismay).63
An essay in the Dutch Spectator, “On the Use and Misuse of Liberty,” argued more
generally that liberty required the exercise of moderation, which in turn entailed
rationality and reasonableness.64 One of the major review periodicals founded in
the 1770s, the ambitions of which were explicitly apologetic, used the device
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58. De Nederlandsche Spectator, 12 vols. (Leiden, 1749–60),
vol. 1 (1749), 129–36 (no. 17: “Pryst een bescheiden
gedrag aan ontrent de Jooden”).
59. Nederlandsche Bibliotheek (1778), 1.332–41; Vaderland-
sche Letter-Oefeningen (1771), 1.103: “a present-day 
Moderate, who advocates Toleration” (een hedendaegsche
Gematigde, de Verdraegzaamheid verdeedigende).
60. Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen (1769), 2.58 (gemaa-
tigdheid en inschiklykheid).
61. Van Eijnatten, Mutua Christianorum tolerantia, 223,
273.
62. Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen (1785), 2.229–36.
63. Nederlandsche Bibliotheek II (1774), 1.336 (met matig-
heid echter en bescheidenheid); review of the Dutch transla-
tion of Johann Gottlieb Töllner, Unterricht von symbo-
lischen Büchern überhaupt (1769). 
64. De Nederlandsche Spectator (1751), 3.153–60 (no. 72).
“Candide & Modeste” on its title page.65 By the end of the century, it was an
unquestioned belief that debates on religion were to be conducted with “candor
and moderation”:66 it was at this time that the periodical called the Modest Church
Reformer was founded.67
The Mean: In Praise of Mediocrity
Closely related to the rise of apologetic writing as an expression of the polite pub-
lic ethic was the rise of historical criticism in biblical exegesis. For if disbelieving
wits and impious philosophers were to be convinced of their frightful errors, the-
ologians would have to employ methods that were both modern and rational.
Above all, extremes had to be avoided. The enormous output of biblical exege-
sis between 1760 and 1840 predictably occurred under the aegis of moderation.68
“I would have wished,” sighed one of the major exegetes of the period, “that peo-
ple had used moderation in Biblical Exegesis all the time.”69
Historical criticism was a powerful instrument in demolishing the
supremacy of confessional theology, but it had to be wielded with care if a the-
ology adapted to national values—a truly popular theology or volkstheologie—was
to be established. Had not Jesus himself, it was asked, exercised prudence in
accommodating religious truths to the limited understanding and general lack of
culture and politeness of his Jewish contemporaries?70 One major text signaling
the progress from a confessional to a polite and national theology was an address
“On Prudently Accommodating Academic Theological Education to the Present
State of the Christian Republic,” delivered in 1794 by Jodocus Heringa, a divine
who would reign in his ﬁeld during the ﬁrst three decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The address was a lengthy recommendation of theological prudence and
modesty, with the aim of developing a broad and tolerant form of positive Chris-
tendom. It was an attempt to give academic theological expression to the ethic
of politeness.71 The same applies to a later address, “On the Modest and Prudent
Interpreter of the Sacred Writings” (1807), which praised modesty as the chief
of virtues, “the guardian of charity, enemy of arrogance, and tutor of wisdom.”72
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65. Nederlandsche Bibliotheek. Cf. also De letter-historie en
boek-beschouwer (Amsterdam, 1763–64), which appeared
under the motto Libere & modeste.
66. De recensent (1787), 1.22 (met rondborstigheid en
gemaatigdheid).
67. De bescheide kerk-hervormer (c. 1770–71).
68. Cf. Carolus Segaar, De critice in divinis novi foederis lib-
ris aeque ac in humanis sed circumspecte et modeste etiamnum
exercenda (Utrecht, 1772).
69. WNT, s.v. “gematigdheid.”
70. Paulus van Hemert, De prudenti Christi apostolorumque
et evangelistarum consilio sermones et scripta ad captum atque
intellectum vulgi quantum illud fieri potuit accommodantium
(Amsterdam, 1790).
71. Jodocus Heringa Ezn., De theologiae in scholis institutione
ad praesentem reipublicae Christianae conditionem prudenter
accommodanda (Utrecht, 1794).
72. Elias Anne Borger, De modesto ac prudenti sacrarum lit-
erarum interprete (Leiden, 1808), 23: “Charitatis igitur cul-
trix, superbiae inimica, sapientiae altrix, censenda est mod-
estia.” 
In these and a multitude of contemporary texts, moderation was naturally
portrayed as the ability to avoid extremes.73 Meanwhile, keeping to the mean had
been promoted, since the 1770s, as the best method of apologetics. Discussing
an anti-deist work by the Swiss divine Johann Jacob Hottinger (1750–1819), for
example, a reviewer noted with satisfaction that he opposed both orthodox super-
stition and libertinist godlessness and argued instead for “what is best and mid-
dling.”74 A major theological society organized an essay competition in the 1780s,
“On the Foolishness of Skepticism, the Absurdity of Determining Issues by
Authority, and the Mean between the Two.”75 The Dutch translation of Theobald
oder die Schwärmer, a novel warning against enthusiasm by the well-known Ger-
man pietist and Marburg professor Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling (1740–1817),
was published under the epigraph “the best state is the middle state.”76 More than
ever before in the Netherlands, the middle way was advocated as the best solu-
tion to contemporary problems.77 In the process, the venerable triad of modesty,
moderation, and the mean began to be advertised not only as constitutive of a
public ethic of Christian citizens, but also as characteristically Dutch.
Perhaps the best example of this development is the address “On Medi-
ocrity,” given by the theologian Johannes Hendrik van der Palm (1763–1840)
at the Holland Society of Arts and Sciences in 1822.78 Van der Palm’s theme was
not immediately concerned with resolving dispute. His was an even grander one:
the praise of mediocrity as a national attribute in general, and its application to
the realm of Dutch beaux arts in particular. Van der Palm contended that medi-
ocrity—het middelmatige in the Latin sense of mediocritas, “that which is of mid-
dle degree”—can be understood in three senses. First, it can signify the golden
mean, the prudent avoidance of emotional extremes. Second, mediocrity may
refer to those unexceptional things to which we usually remain indifferent
because they are simply not good enough for us. Third, and this is the sense in
which van der Palm wished to use it, mediocrity can mean the average. In this
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73. Cf. the academic address by Johannes Hendrik
Regenbogen, De extremis in quae interpretes Sacri Codicis
passim prolapsis sunt sedulo cavendis (1799).
74. Nederlandsche Bibliotheek (1775), 1.370–78, with a
review of Johann Jacob Hottinger, De nonnullorum in
oppugnanda religionis ineptiis ac malis artibus (Leiden, 1774);
Hottinger opposed d’Holbach’s notorious Système de la
nature (1770).
75. Over de dwaasheid der twyfelaary, de ongerymdheid van
het meesteragtig beslissen,en den middenweg tusschen beiden
(Haarlem, 1787); Verhandelingen van het Teyler’s Godgeleerd
Genootschap VII.
76. Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling, Theobald of de dweeper;
onder spreuk: de beste staat is middelmaat, uit echte gebeurtenis-
sen saamgesteld (Dordrecht, 1792).
77. Cf. also Willem Anton van Vloten, Tweede verhande-
ling, den middenweg aanwyzende tusschen de uitersten van den
tegenwoordige tyd [Essay advocating the mean between
present-day extremes] (Amsterdam, 1806). Typically, Jodo-
cus Heringa Ezn., ed., Kerkelijke raadvrager en raadgever
(Utrecht, 1819), 1.2.311, quotes: “Mediam, ut dixi, viam
eligemus, si modeste prudenterque sapere velimus” [We
choose, so to speak, the middle way, if we wish to know
modestly and prudently].
78. Johannes Hendrik van der Palm, “Redevoering over
het middelmatige,” in Redevoeringen, verhandelingen en losse
geschriften. Nieuwe uitgave, 5 vols. (Leeuwarden, 1854),
3.71–88.
last sense, it refers to the inconspicuous, the ordinary and the diurnal, and to the
qualities of mind and heart common to the larger part of mankind. It is the kind
of mediocrity praised by Horace.
There are those, observed Van der Palm, who despise mediocrity from a
position of intellectual or social eminence; yet eminence can only be judged in
comparison with the average.79 Mediocre people make up an important social
group. Forming the basis of our society, they include “decent household fathers,
useful citizens, honest civil servants, busy traders, the untiring promoters of pro-
fessions and handicrafts”—in brief, they represent “everything that may be called
respectable.” These are the people from whom the artistic genius may receive the
praise on which he thrives. A country populated by geniuses alone would be a
nightmare. The minds and spirits of the common masses are middling, and their
role is to maintain balance and harmony in society by eliminating the adverse
effects of extremes. In terms of economics, they constitute a collective counter-
part to the afﬂuent; in terms of ethics, they stand for a moral majority; and in
terms of art, they represent unbiased and uncorrupted criticism. Rejecting the
preposterous notions concerning the Romantic genius developed by his German
contemporaries, Van der Palm extolled the artistic merits of values such as sim-
plicity and domesticity. It should not surprise us that, in the posthumous col-
lection of Van der Palm’s orations, the address “On Mediocrity” is followed by
one “On Common Sense.” Here he connected common sense with three virtues
in particular: composure, modesty, and goodwill.80
Van der Palm was representative of a new generation of theologians who
had appointed themselves moral leaders of the Dutch nation. They integrated
the anti-deist ethic of politeness into the politico-religious ideology that had
underwritten the Dutch state since the French-inspired Batavian Revolution of
1795. The idea that moderation, together with diligence, thrift, and neatness,
amount to a way of achieving domestic happiness was hardly novel;81 but domes-
ticity as such (and the traits implied by it) were ﬁrst turned into national attri-
butes in the early decades of the nineteenth century.82 Likewise, pursuing 
the mean was turned from an Aristotelian recommendation into a national 
characteristic.
Aristotelianism had been out of fashion since the rise of Cartesianism in the
seventeenth-century Dutch Republic and the incursion, somewhat later, of New-
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79. As an accomplished neo-Latinist, Van der Palm uses
the word uitsteken in the Latin sense of eminentia, which is
derived from eminere, to “stick out” (above others).
80. Van der Palm, “Verhandeling over het gezond ver-
stand,” in Redevoeringen, verhandelingen en losse geschriften,
3.89–109.
81. See, for instance, Vaderlandsche Letter-Oefeningen (1787),
1.100–102, with a review of Heinrich M. A. Cramer, Aan-
leiding ter bevordering der huiselyke gelukzaligheid (Amster-
dam, 1786).
82. Ellen J. Krol, De smaak der natie: Opvattingen over
huiselijkheid in de Noord-Nederlandse poëzie van 1800 tot
1840 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1997).
tonianism; but Aristotle’s golden rule achieved a popularity in the early nine-
teenth century that it had not enjoyed for a long time. In the 1800s, every
informed theologian still knew that Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, had
deﬁned virtue as the mean between two extremes, as the average between
deﬁciency and excess. One of the leading theologians of the ﬁrst half of the nine-
teenth century observed that along with one of the greatest thinkers of antiq-
uity (Aristotle, of course), the Bible too praised virtue as the mean between
extremes. The book of Proverbs, for instance, recommends cautious thrift as the
middle way between miserliness and dissipation. The praise of mediocrity by
other ancient authorities, this theologian added, is too well known to be reiter-
ated but then reiterates it:83 while Horace frequently counseled his public to live
for the moment—carpe diem is a principal theme in his poetry—he also insisted
on the golden mean of moderation,84 and Cicero too believed mediocrity to be
the best rule.85
It should be noted that the Dutch were not the only ones anxious in this
period to achieve the mean in all things. During the reign of Louis-Philippe,
between 1830 and 1848, moderation and prudence were embodied in the con-
cept of the juste-milieu (a term taken from Pascal), as a way to integrate the rev-
olution into French society and regulate its threat of dispute, violence, and social
upheaval. As for Germany, mediation became, according to Charles Taylor, a
“cosmic principle” in Hegel’s philosophy.86 German theologians coined the term
Vermittlungstheologie around the middle of the century to name a “mediating the-
ology” designed to ﬁnd a middle ground between the natural and supernatural.87
In various parts of nineteenth-century Europe, the concept of the Mittelstand
(middle class) was developing.88 But the Dutch seem to have been unique in
regarding mediocrity and the mean primarily as moral rather than purely social
categories, and by turning them into national virtues.
Convinced that a Latinate education was essential to preserving the intel-
lectual status of a small nation in a world dominated by French, German, and (to
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83. Herman Bouman, De godgeleerdheid en hare beoefenaars
in Nederland, gedurende het laatste gedeelte der vorige en in de
loop der tegenwoordige eeuw (Utrecht, 1862), 355–56. Cf.
Ypey, Beknopte letterkundige geschiedenis der systematische
godgeleerdheid, 2.XI: “Soon the day will come when all
mankind will together adopt the safe middle course, and,
cured of all blindness, will embrace the simple truth with
well-founded affection.”
84. Horace, Odes 2.x: “Auream quisquis mediocritatem /
Diligit.” Cf. also Horatius, Epistilae I.xviii.9: “Virtus est
medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum.”
85. Cicero, De officiis 2.59: “Mediocritas regula optima
est.”
86. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1975), 104; cited in Johan van der Hoeven,
De aantrekkingskracht van het midden: Historisch-kritische
studie van een westerse denkwijze (Kampen: Kok Agora,
1994), 125. 
87. Bouman, De godgeleerdheid en hare beoefenaars in Ne-
derland, 354, himself refers to a French-language defense 
of this “théologie de compromis” by Frédéric-Auguste
Lichtenberger (1832–99).
88. See Werner Conze, “Mittelstand,” in Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zut politisch-sozialen
Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze,
and Reinhart Koselleck, 7 vols. (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972–
92), 4.49–92.
a somewhat lesser extent) English culture,89 the Dutch cherished classical authors
and, in their wake, advocacy of the golden mean. A wide acknowledgment devel-
oped that Dutch intellectual traditions had always avoided the Scylla of ration-
alism (represented by Spinoza, the deists, and Kant) and the Charybdis of enthu-
siasm (represented by chiliasts, revivalists, Schelling, and German Romanticism
in general). The main contribution of the placid, commonsensical Dutch was, in
effect, to steer the ship of humanity safely through the many rocks and whirlpools
in the maritime landscape. As one academic theologian observed, warning against
Kant’s philosophy, the purpose of university education is to carefully enlighten
students in order to make them see, not expose them to immoderate light so that
they are blinded.90 Although the Dutch readily recognized the earlier signiﬁcant
contributions of German divines, particularly in the ﬁeld of historical criticism,
“liberal” theology was increasingly regarded as a mode of thought suited per-
fectly to the Dutch mind. Dutch theology, asserted a professor who typically
chose the middle path between Kant’s rationalism and Schelling’s enthusiasm,
is to be valued as liberal the more it is associated with prudence and modesty.91
The Leiden theologian Johannes Clarisse (1770–1846) devoted a full address
to the topic in 1815, deﬁning the liberal theologian as one who combines eru-
dition with prudent sincerity, moral freedom, and modest restraint.92
Social and intellectual mediocrity was, then, a prime feature of the early-
nineteenth-century bourgeois class, and it was uncommonly proud of the fact.
The harmonious clerical chorus singing in praise of mediocrity was, however,
somewhat brusquely interrupted in 1854 by a church historian, Christiaan Sepp,
who attempted to sum up the achievements of his immediate predecessors. Gen-
erally accusing the theologians of the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century of
vagueness and half-heartedness, he focused especially on their avoidance of
extremes, their willingness to accommodate, their eagerness to give and take—
on their penchant, in short, for “mediation” (bemiddeling).93 One of the old-guard
divines, Herman Bouman (1789–1864), professor at Utrecht between 1823 and
1859, retaliated with a lengthy book in defense of his defunct colleagues. Medi-
ation, he claimed, was superior to radicalism from a moral point of view, because
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89. Gert-Jan Johannes, De lof der aalbessen: Over (Noord-)
Nederlandse literatuurtheorie, literatuur en de consequenties
van kleinschaligheid 1770–1830 (The Hague: Sdu Uitgev-
ers, 1997).
90. Josué Teissedre l’Ange, Lofrede . . . op Sebald Fulco
Johannes Rau (Haarlem, 1808), 97.
91. Barthold Regner de Geer, De theologia, nostra aetate in
Belgio feliciter exculta (Groningen, 1826): “Liberale hocce
Theologorum Batavorum studium eo magis laudandum
est et celebrandum, quod cum prudentia et modestia coni-
unctum sit.” On liberal theology and the “middle way”
between orthodoxy and rationalism, see Annaeus Ypey,
Geschiedenis van de kristlijke kerk in de achttiende eeuw, 12
vols. (Utrecht, 1797–1815), 8.223–27.
92. Johannes Clarisse, De theologo vere liberali (Leiden,
1815); cf. also Van Voorst, De scriptorum veterum chris-
tianorum studio prudenter ac liberaliter excolendo (Leiden,
1799). 
93. Christiaan Sepp, Proeve eener pragmatische geschiedenis
der theologie hier te lande, sedert het laatst der vorige eeuw tot
op onzen tijd (Haarlem, 1860).
it made due allowance for human limitations. Modesty is the opposite of rash-
ness; while modesty mediates in disputes, rashness begets and fosters discord:
It has always been in the nature of violent political and theological fac-
tiousness that rash people should prefer to tolerate a declared, outright
opponent, over whose errors it seems easy to triumph, rather than a man
who, though valuing the good in everything, chooses an independent
course and refuses to be dominated by anyone’s fame or authority. It is
easier for factious people to accuse the latter, with ostentatious rhetoric,
of vagueness and half-heartedness and sometimes even insincerity, than
contradict by concise argument the views he holds with such composed
moderation.94
The man who calmly and steadfastly opts for the middle course will always be
misjudged by disputatious extremists and the common crowd; yet the aurea medi-
ocritas is a sure path to well-being: “Oh, that past and present nations would have
followed the same rule of moderation in their civil and social life!”95
The Dutch Way?
May we conclude that the ideas on dispute adduced by Dutch divines constitute a
“case,” representative of broader European thought on the issue? At ﬁrst glance,
it would appear that Dutch divines became less relevant as the period between
1670 and 1840 progressed. Whereas around 1670 they participated in a transcon-
fessional and pan-European theological culture, based on Latinity and broadly
accepted norms of scholarly communication, by the end of the period they had
become part of an almost parochial culture in which academics regarded them-
selves as the national bearers of humanist letters and Ciceronian Latin (despite the
fact that the Western linguae francae were now French, German, and English).
But appearances deceive. It is precisely their development of a somewhat
idiosyncratic national ideal that makes Dutch Protestant divines an interesting
case. Previously accepted norms of scholarly communication, academic conduct,
and ecclesiastical discourse were integrated into a broad, civil ethic of politeness,
predicated on notions of reason, liberty, sincerity, and moderation; subsequently
this civil ethic was turned into a national code, and the golden mean in particu-
lar stressed as the Dutch aim par excellence. A public sphere sustaining various
ideas concerning modesty, moderation, and the mean had expanded and changed
from a closely monitored, confessional public sphere into a polite, opinionated,
Va
n
 E
ij
n
at
te
n
 •
Pe
ac
e 
an
d
 M
in
d
: 
Pa
rt
 2
3
3
1
94. Bouman, De godgeleerdheid en hare beoefenaars in Ne-
derland, 352–54. Cf. for precisely the same argument, put
forward much earlier: Johannes van Voorst, De injusto the-
ologiae ad scholae legem diligenter exactae contemtu (Franeker,
1791), 97–98.
95. Bouman, De godgeleerdheid en hare beoefenaars in Ned-
erland, 356. Cf. Ypey, Beknopte letterkundige geschiedenis der
systematische godgeleerdheid, 2.XI. 
and ultimately national public. Dispute had once been universally accepted as a
primary means of establishing and communicating truth (especially religious
truth); it had been possible to control its possibly disrupting consequences by
enjoining upon all participants to respect a moral code centered on modesty.
Excessive disputatiousness, epitomized by the odium theologicum, was simply an
unfortunate result of the lack of self-discipline. Later in the period, the prob-
lem of intellectual—or ideological—conﬂict was regulated by disqualifying dis-
pute altogether. Dispute among moderate and tolerant Christians was not done,
since this merely played into the hands of irreligious critics; the latter were those
who ought to be confuted—though prudently, reasonably, and politely. In the
end, dispute was excluded from the domain of national culture altogether. After
about 1800, disputatiousness was considered all but incompatible with Dutch-
ness. To be Dutch was to be conciliatory, seek consensus, avoid conﬂict.
Although it would hardly be true to say that dispute has been absent from
the Netherlands since 1840, it does appear that the habit of regulating dispute by
disqualifying it eventually became ingrained in Dutch culture and politics. After
the nation-state and its concomitant ideology evolved in the decades around
1800, the Dutch tended to adhere to the bourgeois norm of the mean. They still
do. An ostentatious display of genius and excellence is often frowned upon, and
mediocrity is still regarded as the best way to keep the peace and achieve con-
sensus.96 Indeed, the ﬂat landscape of the Dutch polders is itself a permanent nat-
ural homage to mediocrity.97 The Dutch “polder model” of the 1980s and 1990s,
an economic system based on consensus between employers and labor organi-
zations with a view to controlling wage levels, rests on older ideas concerning
mediation and the mean. It is an open question whether this tradition of con-
sensus and toleration currently runs much deeper than the superﬁcial wish to
avoid anxiety and distress on the part of an afﬂuent middle class, and whether it
will be able to withstand the contemporary breakdown of the traditional nation-
state. After periods of intense religious conﬂict and political discord, the Dutch
learned to regulate dispute by barring open conﬂict from the public domain.
Though it may not be the best solution conceivable, it has been a relatively salu-
tary one. But there is a price to pay.
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96. As in the popular contemporary Dutch expression
“normal behavior is abnormal enough” [doe maar gewoon,
dan doe je al gek genoeg]; or in the Dutch abhorrence of
everything that “sticks out above ground level” [wat boven
het maaiveld uitsteekt].
97. For an application of this national image, see Chris
Lorenz, “The Myth of the Dutch Middle Way: A True
Story about the Dutch Mountains,” Wissenschaftsrecht—
Wissenschaftsverwaltung—Wissenschaftsförderung 33 (2000):
189–209.
